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Since the formation of the 37th government, Channel 14 has benefited from a series of legislative, regulatory, and economic concessions: extensions of temporary exemptions, reductions in license fees and distribution costs, relaxation of ownership restrictions and content obligations, lenient enforcement of violations, increased government advertising, and preferential access to senior government officials. Most of these measures were not formulated as benefits specifically intended for Channel 14, but rather as general arrangements ostensibly applicable to other entities as well. However, an examination of their cumulative effect shows that the channel was repeatedly the main beneficiary, or one of the main beneficiaries, and that a significant regulatory and economic asymmetry was created in its favor.
The document traces how temporary benefits, originally intended to assist a “microchannel” during an adjusment period, were repeatedly extended, while costs that were meant to be borne by the channel were, in part, shifted to the public. Under the arrangements governing Idan Plus, Channel 14 benefited from a substantial reduction in distribution costs and, during certain periods, from distribution free of charge. At the same time, it retained the ability to charge platforms for carrying its broadcasts, even though its competitors were required to provide their broadcasts to those same platforms without compensation. Communications Minister Karhi’s Broadcasting Law seeks to entrench many of these concessions within the new regulatory framework for the broadcasting market, including by raising the revenue ceiling for “microchannel” status from NIS 80 million to NIS 2 billion and easing ownership restrictions and regulatory obligations applicable to commercial channels generally.
These legislative measures are accompanied by institutional conduct that has further strengthened the channel. The document identifies a pattern of non-enforcement by the Second Authority for Television and Radio, including after temporary concessions had expired and during a period in which Channel 14’s eligibility to retain its “microchannel” status remained unresolved. At the same time, the volume of government advertising purchased from the channel has increased sharply, while the prime minister has granted the channel numerous interviews over the years and has largely refrained from granting interviews to the other major news channels. This pattern is further reinforced by the frequent appearances of ministers and coalition members on the channel and by the allocation of Knesset time and resources to proceedings dealing specifically with the channel’s affairs.
The cumulative picture extends beyond the question of an economic benefit to a particular media outlet. When the state alters the rules of the game, allocates public resources, and deploys its institutions in ways that repeatedly strengthen a media outlet identified with the government, while its competitors remain subject to more onerous obligations, both equality in the media market and the independence of the press are undermined. Free and pluralistic media is essential to effective public scrutiny of government. Blurring the line between government support and free competition in the media market ultimately affects the conditions under which the public receives information, forms its views, and holds elected officials to account.