

Benefits for Channel 14: The Gift That Keeps on Giving

How Legislation, Regulation, and Public Funds Bolstered the Government's Propaganda Channel

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Since the establishment of the 37th government, Channel 14 has benefited from a cumulative series of legislative, regulatory, and budgetary concessions. These have included extensions of temporary exemptions, reductions in distribution costs and license fees, exemptions from obligations imposed on its competitors, easing of restrictions on ownership and content, lenient enforcement of violations, a surge in government advertising, and preferential access to senior government officials.

Most of these arrangements were not formulated as benefits specifically intended for Channel 14, but rather as general measures applying to other entities as well. Nevertheless, a review of their cumulative effect shows that Channel 14 has been the main beneficiary, or one of the main beneficiaries, and that a significant regulatory and economic asymmetry has been created in its favor.

Introduction

Free, independent, and pluralistic media are a fundamental condition for the viability of democracy. They enable the public to form opinions based on a variety of information sources, provide effective scrutiny of the government, and reduce the power and information gaps between the government and its citizens. When a government changes regulatory rules, allocates public resources, and grants preferential access in ways that strengthen a friendly media outlet and concurrently impede critical ones, equality in the marketplace of ideas, an independent press, and the public's ability to oversee its elected officials are undermined.

Channel 14 effectively serves as a propaganda arm of the government. This is reflected, among other things, in its lineup, which is largely built around programs that echo the government's messaging. The channel presents itself as a journalistic entity, but is often used to disseminate spin, incitement, and, at times, false information.

In the four years since the establishment of the current Netanyahu government, the channel has benefited from a long series of governmental, legislative, regulatory, and

budgetary benefits, which this document seeks to identify. The systematic bolstering of a media outlet identified with the government, at the expense of its competitors and of the public purse, is a familiar pattern in anti-liberal regimes, where the boundary between media and propaganda becomes blurred.

It is important to clarify that most of the benefits were not expressly or specifically established for the channel, but accumulated over time into a series of ostensibly general arrangements, of which Channel 14 was the main beneficiary, or at least one of the principal ones. This structure made it possible to largely avoid the legal and public difficulties associated with legislation explicitly tailored to the channel.

Accordingly, the term "benefit for Channel 14" is used in a consequential rather than formal sense. A law, regulation, or decision need not specifically name the channel, as it is enough for the measure to provide it with a significant regulatory, economic, or competitive advantage in practice. The indirect and cumulative nature of these benefits also makes it difficult to map them and assess their full impact.

For ease of reference, the table below charts all the benefits granted to the channel under the 37th government and their current status. Details about each benefit appear later in the document.

Date of Benefit	Course of Action	Beneficial Impact on Channel 14	Status
February 2023	Amendment No. 48 to SATR Law	Extension of transitional provisions and exemptions for "microchannel licensees" set under Amendment No. 44 to Second Authority for Television and Radio Law	Expired; extended under Amendment No. 49
July 2024	Amendment No. 49 to SATR Law	Further extension of transitional provisions and exemptions established for "microchannel licensees" under Amendment No. 44	Expired 25 February 2026
August 2024	Amendment No. 7 to Broadcasting Distribution Law	Free distribution via Idan Plus system and exemption of microchannels from obligation to provide live broadcasts free of charge	Applied retroactively; expired
March 2025	Extension of Amendment No. 7 to Broadcasting Distribution Law	Extension of free distribution benefits under Idan Plus and exemption of microchannels from obligation to provide live broadcasts free of charge	Expired 15 June 2025

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April 2026	Amendment No. 8 to Broadcasting Distribution Law	Reduced payment for distribution via Idan Plus	In force until 1 April 2029 or closure of Idan Plus, whichever comes first
July 2026	Communications Law (Broadcasting)	Expansion of definition of "microchannel," reduction of content and journalistic ethics obligations, and exemptions in relations with platforms	Legislated; most provisions pend future implementation while others have been frozen by the Supreme Court
July 2026	SATR Regulations (Finance)	Transition from fixed license fee to proportional mechanism that could save channel millions of shekels annually	In force
2023-2026	Appointment of government cronies to SATR	Erosion of SATR's autonomy at a time when it must oversee the channel's revenues, status, and obligations	Frozen by Supreme Court; government announced it would not comply with the ruling
2023-2026	Non-enforcement by SATR	Benefits continue to stream in despite failure to provide revenue data; regulatory obligations remain unenforced after temporary concessions expired	Ongoing; eligibility for "microchannel" status has yet to be settled
2023-2026	Surge in government advertising	Allocation of inflated public advertising budgets boosts channel's revenues, commercial power, and market position	Ongoing; Government Advertising Bureau protocol for equality and transparency adopted
2023-2026	Exclusive interviews and preferential access to premier and ministers	Exclusive interviews with prime minister and preferential access to senior government officials generate ratings, advertising demand, and competitive advantage	Ongoing
2023-2026	Bespoke Knesset debates to benefit the channel	Allocation of parliamentary time and resources to the channel, pressure on advertisers and regulators, providing the channel with a platform and legitimacy	Ongoing

Key: ■ In force / ongoing ■ Frozen by Supreme Court ■ Expired

Starting Point: "Microchannel" Regime Created in 2018

Amendment No. 44 to the Second Authority for Television and Radio Law (SATR law), published in February 2018, allowed Channel 20 (which went on to become Channel 14) to change its status from "designated microchannel licensee" required to focus on heritage content, to "microchannel licensee" without a similar restriction on content. The amendment created a more lenient regulatory track for channels whose annual revenues do not exceed NIS 80 million.

The legislative change created two distinct ranks. The first is a more lenient **permanent regime** applying to a microchannel licensee, including the option to broadcast news

without a separate news company and reduced obligations pertaining to content. The second is a five-year **"transitional period,"** during which additional exemptions were granted to allow adaptation to the new regulatory regime. The transitional period was supposed to end on 25 February 2023.

Why is this distinction important?

The "microchannel" track was not created during the past four years. However, the current Knesset extended temporary benefits after their expiration, created new distribution benefits, and subsequently made fundamental changes to the revenue threshold and regulatory regime, so that the concessions may continue to apply to significantly larger channels. Under the Broadcasting Law that was enacted, but has not yet gone into force, all existing commercial channels are defined as "microchannels."

Concessions for Microchannels Under the Permanent Regime¹

Below are the permanent regulatory concessions available to a channel defined as a "microchannel" under Amendment No. 44 (it should be noted that, as of the date of this document, Channel 14's classification as a microchannel for 2025 remained undetermined, owing to its failure to report its revenues):

- Exemption from the requirement of structural separation in news broadcasting: A microchannel may produce and broadcast newscasts without going through a separate news company.
- Significant concessions concerning journalistic ethics: A microchannel is not subject to the full range of ethical obligations imposed on news companies. Among other things, it is not required to follow the Israel Press Council's Code of Ethics and is not required to establish an ethics committee headed by a retired judge. The few ethical rules applicable to it were established in 1994 and are ill-suited to the developments in the media market since then. Consequently, a microchannel is exempt from ethical obligations established by law and by the licensing conditions applicable to news companies, including the obligation to ensure that news broadcasts are accurate,

* English-language reference. All other references in this document are in Hebrew.

¹ Tal Hillel, [*Government Uses Regulatory Benefits to Establish Channel 14 as Propaganda Arm](#), *Zulat* (1 October 2024).

reliable, and balanced, and that they do not reflect the personal positions and opinions of the company's managers, employees, or shareholders.

- Exemption from requirements concerning investment in local production: A microchannel is not subject to the requirement that at least 40% of all its broadcasts consist of local productions, nor to the requirement that at least 50% of this quota be allocated to purchased content.
- Reduced enforcement concerning advertising: SATR's authority to limit the advertising airtime of a channel that violates the rules does not fully apply to a microchannel.
- Exemption from advertising restrictions: Microchannels are subject to more permissive rules governing the volume, timing, duration, and intervals between advertisements than those applicable to other channels.
- Exemption from requirements concerning premium productions: A microchannel is not required to allocate funds toward the production of premium programs.
- Exemption from requirements concerning investment in Israeli cinema: A microchannel is not required to participate in financing the production of Israeli films or investing therein.

Extension of Transitional Provisions (Amendments No. 48 and No. 49 to the SATR Law)²

The transitional period established in 2018 was set to expire upon the establishment of the 37th government. Amendment No. 48, expedited in early 2023, extended it by 18 months, while Amendment No. 49 passed in July 2024 extended it once again until 25 February 2026. The communications minister presented the extension as a temporary solution until the finalization of the Broadcasting Law.³

The following are the temporary regulatory concessions granted to microchannels (whose validity expired in February 2026):

- Exemption from ownership concentration limits: A single owner was permitted to hold more than 74% of a microchannel's equity and voting rights, contrary to the limit applicable to television licensees generally.

² Tal Hillel, [*Government Uses Regulatory Benefits to Establish Channel 14 as Propaganda Arm](#), *Zulat* (1 October 2024).

³ [Second Authority for Television and Radio Law \(Amendment No. 49\), 2024](#), *Knesset National Legislation Database* (24 July 2024).

- Exemption from cross-ownership restrictions: A radio concessionaire was permitted to also own a television license, even though the law generally restricts simultaneous ownership of different types of media.
- Exemption from annual license fees: A microchannel was exempt from annual license fees for the duration of the temporary provision. As discussed below, following the expiration of this exemption, the government amended the relevant regulations in a manner that enabled Channel 14 to continue paying reduced fees.
- Concessions regarding licensing conditions and guarantees: A microchannel was granted relief from the regulatory and financial requirements associated with holding a license, including requirements concerning guarantees and collateral.
- Exemption from minimum conditions for obtaining a license: A microchannel was exempted from some of the prerequisites generally required to obtain a television broadcasting license, enabling it to acquire a license without meeting all the requirements imposed on other applicants.

As noted, the temporary provision was supposed to provide a brief period of adaptation. Its re-extension, five and six years after the creation of the track, turned temporary concessions into a tool that continued to protect Channel 14's business and ownership model even after the channel had become firmly established.

Idan Plus Laws: Shifting Distribution Costs to the Public

Upon the outbreak of the war in Gaza in October 2023, the communications minister instructed SATR to immediately add Channels 9, 14, 24, and Hala TV, as well as the regional and sectoral radio stations, to Idan Plus (Israel's digital terrestrial television system) until the end of the fighting.⁴ The stated justification for the move was the security situation, an argument that was not corroborated by the relevant professional authorities. The minister's directive was issued without legal authority and in contravention of the law, which requires all commercial channels transmitting their broadcasts through the system to pay distribution fees.

Amendment No. 7 to the Broadcast Distribution Via Digital Stations Law, enacted as a temporary provision in August 2024, established the obligation to distribute microchannels via Idan Plus and exempted commercial channels from distribution fees as of 7 October 2023. Applying the exemption retroactively legalized this distribution post factum and

⁴ * [Idan Plus Is Expanding During the War](#), Ministry of Communications (12 October 2023).

allowed the charges that had accrued during the interim period to go unpaid, while shifting the operating costs to the Israeli Public Broadcasting Corporation (IPBC), the Knesset Channel, and the State Treasury. The amendment provided yet another advantage to Channel 14: While Channels 12 and 13 were required to make their live broadcasts available to internet platforms free of charge, microchannels were exempt from this obligation for the duration of the temporary provision. As a result, Channel 14 was able to benefit from free distribution through a public system while simultaneously seeking payment from internet platforms for carrying its broadcasts. The temporary provision was initially set to remain in effect until 31 January 2025, but in March 2025 the arrangement was extended until 15 June 2025.⁵

Amendment No. 8, enacted in April 2026, created a graduated payment mechanism for three years, from 1 April 2026 until 1 April 2029, or until the Idan Plus system is closed down, whichever comes first. Distribution fees were set according to the entity's 2024 revenues as follows: no payment for revenues of up to NIS 40 million, NIS 120,000 for revenues of NIS 40–220 million, NIS 600,000 for revenues of NIS 220–600 million, and NIS 1.3 million for revenues above NIS 600 million.⁶

According to TheMarker, SATR classified Channel 14 in the NIS 120,000 bracket, compared with NIS 600,000 for Reshet and NIS 1.3 million for Keshet.⁷ Even after the graduated payment was introduced, most of Idan Plus's operating costs continue to fall on public bodies: the Knesset continues to pay NIS 5.488 million annually for the Knesset Channel, IPBC bears the remainder of the operating costs, and the State Treasury contributes to the cost of repairs.

In addition, a retroactive transitional provision for the period from 15 June 2025 through 31 March 2026 exempted commercial channels and radio stations from distribution fees, with the balance financed from public funds. The cumulative result is a sharp reduction in distribution costs for Channel 14, as a substantial portion of the cost of distribution was shifted to the public.

⁵ [Law on Broadcast Distribution Via Digital Channels \(Amendment No. 7 - Temporary Provision\), 2024](#), *Knesset National Legislation Repository* (6 August 2024).

⁶ [Law on Broadcast Distribution Via Digital Channels \(Amendment No. 8 - Temporary Provision\), 2026](#), *Knesset National Legislation Repository* (30 March 2026).

⁷ Yasmin Guetta, [Will Channel 14 Pay Now? Economic Affairs Committee Approves New Arrangement for Financing Idan Plus System](#), *TheMarker* (24 March 2026).

Karhi's Broadcasting Law: Regulatory Concessions Become Permanent Structure

The Communications Law (Broadcasting), which the Knesset finalized in July 2026, contains a broad reform that does not apply solely to Channel 14. Nevertheless, several of its provisions directly align with the channel's regulatory needs. This was so obvious to MK Galit Distel (Likud), chair of the special committee discussing the law, that she pointed the finger at Channel 14 and other right-wing media outlets: "You don't even look at this committee, but I'm the one who is single-handedly keeping your screen from going dark right now. Right-wing MKs do nothing but moan and groan about the media all day long, but this committee is the money time."⁸

The law grants the channel numerous regulatory benefits, the most significant of which is an indirect amendment to the SATR Law that raises the revenue ceiling for the definition of a "microchannel licensee" from NIS 80 million to NIS 2 billion. The higher ceiling ensures that growth in Channel 14's revenues does not disqualify it from the lenient regulatory regime and preempts claims of inequality among commercial channels. Since all existing commercial channels fall below the NIS 2 billion threshold, the revised definition effectively transforms a regulatory track intended for a small player into a framework that applies to virtually the entire market.

Law's Main Benefits Favoring Channel 14

- Expansion of definition of "microchannel": Raising the threshold 25-fold, from NIS 80 million to NIS 2 billion, eliminates the risk that revenue growth will result in the loss of the concessions.
- News and structural separation: The law reduces the institutional mechanisms separating the licensee from the news company and weakens safeguards intended to prevent stakeholders from intervening in content.
- Single owner: The law abolishes the prohibition on holding more than 74% of a channel.
- Cross-ownership: The law abolishes or reduces restrictions on simultaneous control of several media outlets and between channels and platforms.
- Original productions: Providers exempt from investment requirements will enter a graduated process beginning at 2.8% of their revenues in 2027 and reaching 6.5% in 2032.

⁸ Bini Ashkenazi, [In Rare Departure, Galit Distel Attacks Channel 14 and Praises Opposition](#), *Israel Hayom* (25 March 2026).

This is a more lenient entry path compared with the historical obligations imposed on Keshet and Reshet.

- Relay of content for delayed viewing: The obligation to provide content to distributors free of charge is conditioned on holding more than 40% of the advertising market. Under the existing market structure, this condition is expected to apply to Channels 12 and 13, but not to Channel 14.
- News broadcasts from Jerusalem: The law abolishes the requirement to relocate the channel's news operations from Modi'in to the Jerusalem District, as the channel continued to broadcast from Modi'in even after the temporary exemption expired.
- Relations with platforms: The permanent and transitional provisions obligate channels with large market shares to provide content free of charge, while Channel 14 is effectively exempt and may go on demanding payment for its broadcasts.

It should be noted that the Supreme Court issued an interim injunction suspending implementation of the provisions that were due to take effect immediately upon publication of the law. The Court found that the petitions raised substantial legal arguments and that, absent interim relief, restoring the previous legal position might prove difficult. Since most of the provisions were scheduled to take effect 24 months after publication, the measures established by the law should be understood as prospective rather than as benefits that have already materialized.

Reduction of License Fees Through Regulations

In February 2026, the transitional benefit granted to microchannels under Amendment No. 44 of 2018 expired. Therefore, in July 2026, the Ministry of Communications published a draft bylaw replacing the uniform annual license fee of NIS 11.42 million with a proportional mechanism consisting of 1.6% of the channel's average revenues over the previous three years, which has already entered into force.⁹ According to a calculation published by Calcalist, Channel 14's payment could amount to NIS 1.6 million, meaning that the savings compared with the fixed fee could come to NIS 7-9 million per year. The use of a three-year average is particularly advantageous to a growing entity because years with lower revenues pull the assessment base downward.

⁹ [Second Authority for Television and Radio Regulations \(Finance\), 1992](#), *Nevo* (last updated 7 February 2024).

Appointment of SATR Council, Eroding Regulator's Independence

In March 2026, the government approved Communications Minister Shlomo Karhi's recommendation to appoint his associate, Dr. Yifat Ben-Hai Segev, as chair of the SATR Council, as well as the appointment of Kinneret Barashi, an attorney and television personality identified with Channel 14.

The process was accompanied by allegations of political favoritism, meddling by the minister's aides, and an attempt to change the balance of power on the council. Seven members announced their resignation following heavy political pressure by Karhi's bureau chief Elad Zamir, and the Supreme Court froze some of the nominations and reinstated the previous council.¹⁰ Following the suspension of her appointment by the court, Ben-Hai Segev announced that she was withdrawing her candidacy. Symbolically, Ben-Hai Segev chose to announce her decision on Channel 14, on the program The Patriots.¹¹

Erosion of the regulator's independence represents a systemic benefit to a channel under its supervision, particularly at a time when the council was due to review Channel 14's revenues, its status as a microchannel, its reporting obligations, and its continued broadcasting of news from Modi'in.

Non-Enforcement as Benefit: Failure to Provide Revenue Data, Retention of 'Microchannel' Status

Microchannel licensee status is conditional on revenues remaining below the threshold established by law, making revenue reporting a basic requirement for regulatory oversight. Channel 14 did not provide all the data required for 2025 on time, requested an extended grace period, and was fined only a few tens of thousands of shekels. According to reports, SATR imposed a conditional fine of NIS 75,000 and an additional NIS 85,000 fine if the data were not submitted by another deadline.¹²

At the same time, estimates had it that the channel's advertising revenues had long since exceeded the NIS 80 million threshold and had even reached some NIS 150 million, but these were not audited or publicly available figures.¹³ Zulat demanded that SATR stop granting benefits hinging on microchannel status until Channel 14 proved its eligibility.

¹⁰ Itamar Baz, [Supreme Court Demands Answers from Minister Karhi Regarding Pressure Exerted by His Office on SATR Members](#), *The Seventh Eye* (10 June 2026).

¹¹ Itamar Baz, [Live on Channel 14: Yifat Ben-Hai Segev Withdraws from SATR Chair Race](#), *The Seventh Eye* (27 July 2026).

¹² Chen Agri, [Revoke Channel 14's Special Status](#), *The Seventh Eye* (21 July 2026).

¹³ Yasmin Guetta, [SATR Fines Channel 14 for Concealing Revenue Data, Takes Grave View of 'Channel's Conduct](#), *TheMarker* (5 July 2026).

When the potential fine may come to a few tens of thousands of shekels while the exemptions may total millions, there is a clear economic incentive to delay reporting. As of the date of this document, the council had not published a final, reasoned decision regarding the channel's status for 2025.

When a regulator refrains from imposing sanctions or collecting payment for an extended period of time, the economic result may amount to an exemption.

Non-Enforcement After Expiry of Transitional Period in February 2026

The concessions established under the transitional period expired on 25 February 2026. Accordingly, SATR should have required Channel 14 to bring its operations and ownership structure into compliance with the legal provisions applicable to television licensees, or at a minimum those applicable to a microchannel. This included examining the continued ownership by a single party of more than 74% of the channel, compliance with cross-ownership restrictions, and fulfillment of the conditions, guarantees, and other requirements pertaining to its license. However, as of the writing of this document, there had been no reports that SATR had required Channel 14 to make the necessary adjustments, set a timetable for correcting the violations, or initiated enforcement proceedings against it for continuing to operate under the expired arrangements. Thus, SATR effectively allowed the concessions to remain in force without an explicit statutory basis, thereby de facto extending the benefits to Channel 14, undermining the rule of law and equality among licensees, and blurring the boundary between discretionary enforcement and perversion of the law through non-enforcement.

Continued Broadcasting from Modi'in After Exemption Expired

The temporary exemption from the requirement to broadcast news from the Jerusalem District expired, but Channel 14 continued to operate its news division from Modi'in.¹⁴ During a July 2025 meeting of the Economics Committee, the Knesset's legal counsels asserted that the law did not permit another extension without legislation. Nevertheless, enforcement was left up to SATR and the channel continued broadcasting from Modi'in. The aforementioned Broadcasting Law resolved the issue retroactively by abolishing the requirement altogether, but its provisions have not yet entered into force.

¹⁴ Adiel Eitan Mustaki, [Yet Another Gift: Economics Committee to Vote for Extending Channel 14's Exemption from Broadcasting News from Jerusalem](#), *Calcalist* (28 July 2025).

When a regulator refrains from enforcement for an extended period of time and the legislature subsequently abolishes a requirement, the economic effect is similar to extending an exemption: the costs of relocation, rent, infrastructure, and personnel are avoided. No reliable public figure is available to quantify the full savings, but the channel itself has stated that it invested substantial sums in its Modi'in premises, illustrating the economic value of avoiding relocation.

Surge in Government Advertising

With the establishment of the 37th government, the volume of advertising purchased from Channel 14 by government ministries headed by Likud ministers, including the Prime Minister's Office, registered a sharp increase. At the same time, there has been a clear surge in the overall volume of advertising purchased from the channel compared with the preceding "government of change" headed by Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid. These purchases are paid by public funds that government ministries allocate in accordance with their respective policies, often following the personal intervention of ministers or senior officials. The upswing began in July 2023, six months after the ministers took office, with the amount of airtime purchased from Channel 14 shooting up 35% compared with 2022, when the "government of change" was in power. The most significant increases occurred in ministries headed by Likud ministers.

In October 2023, following the massacre on the Gaza border, the Prime Minister's Office began advertising on Channel 14 continuously for three months, purchasing a total of 83 minutes of airtime: more than most other ministries purchased throughout all of 2023. The purchases resumed in October 2024. This was not personal propaganda on behalf of Netanyahu, as there is no need to purchase airtime on Channel 14 for such content to be broadcast, but rather a decision to allocate campaign funds to the channel from bodies subordinate to the Prime Minister's Office, such as the Hostage and Missing Persons Headquarters headed by Gal Hirsch and the National Cyber Directorate, which ran a campaign against the fake news "pandemic" starring the actor Yaniv Biton.

A similar surge was recorded in four other government ministries currently headed by Likud ministers: Miri Regev's Ministry of Transportation, Nir Barkat's Ministry of Economy, Avi Dichter's Ministry of Agriculture, and Yoav Gallant's Ministry of Defense. Of all the Likud-led ministries examined, only one recorded a clear drop in advertising volume: Idit Silman's Ministry of Environmental Protection.

A similar effect was recorded at the Israel Police, which has undergone accelerated politicization under Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir. Under the "government of change" in 2022 and again in 2023 under Ben-Gvir, the police purchased virtually no airtime from Channel 14. In 2024, it suddenly became one of the top purchasers, procuring some 123 minutes of advertising over a five-month period. The ads, which offered a flattering picture of Israel Police's performance on October 7 and the ensuing war, were used to recruit personnel. The final slide noted they were part of a joint campaign by the Israel Police and Ben-Gvir's ministry.¹⁵

The significance: Even when each ad is purchased at market price, the preferential allocation of government advertising to a particular media outlet directs revenue to this outlet, strengthens its financial standing, and signals its legitimacy and success to the private advertising market.

In light of the above, Zulat and the Movement for Fair Regulation petitioned the Supreme Court over the way the government, its ministers, and the prime minister contract with media outlets, focusing on the economic advantages granted to Channel 14 through the reallocation of government advertising budgets and exclusive interviews. The petition argued that when the government, its ministries, or senior officials decide where advertising budgets will be directed, or which media outlets will receive preferential access to the prime minister and ministers, this is tantamount to using public resources, public funds, and governmental power, which is why such decisions must be made on the basis of professional, equitable, objective, and transparent considerations.¹⁶

On 17 June 2026, the state notified the court that it had adopted the Government Advertising Bureau's (GAB) "Media Planning and Purchasing Protocol." The latter affirms that GAB is the primary official government body responsible for contracting with media organizations for advertising purposes and that it must operate in accordance with administrative law and on the basis of professional, equitable, and uniform considerations. It further establishes that government ministries are required to obtain advertising services through GAB, except in specified cases, and that GAB will publish all of its media-purchasing contracts every six months, broken down by media organization, thereby creating a

¹⁵ Itamar Baz, [Revealed: Government Advertising on Channel 14 Surged After Netanyahu's Return to Power](#), *Shakuf* (9 November 2024).

¹⁶ The petition also addressed the government's decision to terminate its contract with the newspaper *Haaretz*, arguing that this was a unilateral move creating a clear economic preference for certain media organizations for political reasons. According to the petitioners, allowing this situation to continue enables the improper use of state funds, provides financial advantages to a commercial entity in bad faith, and harms the principle of equality and the rules of proper administration.

markedly transparent oversight mechanism that will enable the public to examine how government advertising budgets are distributed among media outlets. In its ruling of 29 June 2026, the court adopted the petitioners' position requiring the state to submit an additional update regarding amendments to the Treasury regulations governing contracts between government ministries and media organizations.¹⁷

Exclusive Interviews and Preferential Access to Prime Minister

Since March 2021, Prime Minister Netanyahu has almost entirely refrained from sitting for interviews with Israeli news channels 11, 12, and 13, while repeatedly granting interviews to Channel 14. According to documentation by The Seventh Eye, by early 2025 Netanyahu had given Channel 14 and its predecessor dozens of interviews, totaling more than 11 hours. The interviews generated record ratings for the channel: 5.8% in October 2022, 9.3% in April 2023, and 13.8% in June 2024.¹⁸

An exclusive interview with an incumbent prime minister is a scarce public resource with significant commercial value: it attracts viewers, increases demand for advertising, and can help shape viewing habits. Its impact is further amplified by the promotion of such interviews through the prime minister's official accounts, frequent appearances on the channel by ministers and coalition members, and the alleged favoring of its journalists at press briefings. Although it does not constitute a budget allocation, this consistent partiality affords the channel a clear competitive advantage.

Use of Knesset's Resources and Institutions in Channel's Favor

Under this government, an unusual amount of parliamentary time was devoted to proceedings dealing explicitly with Channel 14, in addition to the time allocated by Knesset committees to legislation specifically intended to benefit it, as discussed extensively above. For example, the Economics Committee held a debate in July 2025 concerning the requirement that the channel relocate to Jerusalem,¹⁹ as well as two sessions addressing allegations of an "advertiser boycott."²⁰ For its part, the National Security Committee

¹⁷ [Supreme Court Petition: Stop Illegal Allocation of Public Funds to Channel 14](#), *Zulat* (11 February 2026).

¹⁸ Shabi Gatenio, [Why TV Channels Stay Silent on Netanyahu's Interview Boycott](#), *The Seventh Eye* (6 January 2025).

¹⁹ [Economics Committee Chair Bitan Calls on Communications Ministry to Amend Law, Abolish Requirement for Commercial Channels to Relocate News Operations to Jerusalem, Grant Extension to Channel 14](#), *Knesset News* (28 July 2025).

²⁰ [Economics Committee Chair Bitan Demands Answers from Competition Authority and Justice Ministry After Heated Session on Advertiser Boycott of Channel 14: You Can't Boycott It to Shut It Down](#), *Knesset News* (11 September 2024); Nevo Trabelsi, [Economics Committee Wanted to Discuss Advertisers' Flight from Channel 14, But Nobody Showed Up](#), *Globes* (13 September 2023).

scheduled a hearing entitled "Investigation of Channel 14's Staff: Harm to Freedom of the Press and the Democratic Space," which committee chair MK Zvika Fogel claimed was canceled because the Attorney General and the State Attorney refused to attend.²¹ These hearings do not constitute a financial benefit per se, but they provide the channel with a platform, legitimacy, and official support for advancing its regulatory demands.

Cumulative Picture and Democratic Implications

The document attests to a gradual accumulation of indulgences: extensions of temporary exemptions; public financing of distribution; the option to seek payment from platforms while competitors are required to provide their broadcasts free of charge; a 25-fold increase in the revenue limit for a "microchannel"; reduced ownership, news, and original-production obligations; potential reduction in license fees; and lenient enforcement of conditions determining eligibility for the benefits.

These measures are reinforced by a clear pattern of non-legislative support: a surge in government advertising, exclusive access to the prime minister, and the use of Knesset institutions to advance the channel's interests. While some of these measures also benefit other entities, and some allegations of preferential treatment remain pending before the Supreme Court, their cumulative effect is nonetheless significant. Taken together, they have produced a clear asymmetry: a media outlet identified with the government has repeatedly benefited from regulatory concessions, reduced costs, and access to public resources, while its competitors have remained subject to more onerous obligations and, in some cases, have even been required to provide the outlet with commercial assets free of charge.

The democratic implications extend far beyond the financial gains of individual media outlets. When the government reshapes the rules of the media market to favor a supportive outlet while undermining the economic and institutional independence of critical ones, it affects not only the structure of the market but also the conditions under which the public accesses information and holds elected officials to account.

²¹ Rivka Shorek, [Due to Attorney General's Nonattendance: Hearing on Investigation of Channel 14 Staff Canceled](#), *CI4* (18 May 2026).